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COMMENTS
arbitration are valid and binding; the inference from the Kirouac case is
that the Boughton and Levy decisions may not stand up, or if at all, be
applied with care and a certain reluctance. Most courts follow the doc-
trine of refusing to decide questions prematurely or not raised by the facts
in the particular case. The New Hampshire court's reluctance to decide
the questions of the effect of the "no action without consent" exclusion
and whether the company is bound by the insured's suit against the tort-
feasor certainly indicates the court will carefully scrutinize the cases be-
fore either invalidating the exclusion or invoking the res judicata concept
discussed above.
Time alone will not provide the answers to the questions which have
plagued plaintiff and insurance lawyers in this field. The adoption by the
Illinois legislature of the Uniform Arbitration Act36 indicates that future
decisions interpreting its effect on the Cocalis case and on cases like Levy
will be forthcoming; its adoption in other states will result in similar
changes in the law of the forums.
36 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, SS 101-123 (1961).
OBSCENITY-CONSTITUTIONAL OBSCENITY: THE
SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION
The architects of our constitution realized that freedom of speech and
of press are indispensable to the informed citizenry required to make dem-
ocratic self-government work. Justice Frankfurter concisely reiterated
this belief when he observed that: "Freedom of expression is the well-
spring of our civilization."'
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the
free speech guarantee is not limited to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority,2 but that the "test of its substance
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing or-
der."'3 Ideas, no matter how "odious their expression may be to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion, ' 4 are likewise most rigidly protected by the
First Amendment. These free speech guarantees are also safeguarded from
invasion by state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
1 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (concurring opinion).
2 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
3 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
4 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
5 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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Although unconventional and odious ideas are stringently protected by
the First Amendment, it is well understood that liberty of speech, and of
the press, are not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. 6 Jus-
tice Holmes, in Frohwerk v. United States, declared that:
the First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such
cannot have been, and obviously was not intended to give immunity for every
possible use of language.7
Justice Cardozo, speaking more generally, observed that: "Complete free-
dom-unfettered and undirected-there never is."'8
The limitations placed on the freedom of speech doctrine stem un-
doubtedly from a recognition that the right of free speech may be em-
ployed in such a manner as to gravely and adversely affect the interests of
society, while adding nothing to the exposition of new ideas and new
truths. As a result, the courts have recognized that the panoply of the
free speech guarantee does not apply absolutely to libelous utterances, 9
fighting or insulting words, 10 or seditious language."
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right of free speech
does not protect all forms of lewd and obscene expressions. The problem
here is the same as in the above mentioned cases, that is, "the formulation
of constitutionally allowable safeguards which society may take against
evil without impinging upon the necessary dependence of a free society
upon the fullest scope of free expression."'12 In the case of lewd, immoral,
or obscene expressions, the question is, how base, degrading or shocking
must these expressions be, to be deprived of the protection of the First
Amendment.18
The complexity of this problem is best illustrated by the many con-
curring and dissenting opinions expressed in each case concerning ob-
scene expressions. To understand what types of obscene expressions are
not constitutionally protected, a careful examination of the opinions of
all the Supreme Court Justices is necessary in order to determine their
areas of agreement. For in obscenity cases, it is rare indeed, when a major-
ity of the Court joins in the opinion of one justice. Therefore, to better
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
8 CARDozo, GROWTH OF THE LAW 61 (1924).
9 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
10 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
12 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 694 (1959).
18 Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What
is Obscene? 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961).
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understand the Supreme Court's position on obscene expressions, we look
to these opinions for areas of agreement, but in the final analysis, we look
"to what the Court has done, and not what it has said."'14
The first case to contribute to the present constitutional status of ob-
scenity was Butler v. Michigan.15 In that case a Michigan statute 6 made
it a misdemeanor to sell or make available to the general reading public
any book containing obscene language "tending to the corruption of the
morals of youth." The Supreme Court reversed such a conviction, and
in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Frankfurter held that so far as
distribution of materials to the general public is concerned, the impact on
the young is irrelevant. The impact on the average adult was declared to
be the constitutionally required test in determining the "obscenity" of
materials distributed generally.
The Court, by so ruling, recognized that different standards exist as to
what materials can constitutionally be withheld from the general public
as opposed to those which can be withheld from children alone.' The
Court did not attempt to define the standard for either class. All it said
was that a standard, which is based on the sensitivity of children, is un-
constitutional when used to censor publications generally distributed, as
the breadth of allowable reading material for adults is much broader than
for children.
Four months later the Supreme Court set out the standard to be used in
determining whether a publication of general circulation is obscene. The
decision disposed of two separate cases at one time. Roth v. United
States,18 the first of these two, involved a New York defendant who was
convicted of violating the federal obscenity statute19 which prohibited
14 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13, at 292.
15 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
16 MICHGAN PENAL CODE ch. 750, § 343 (1943).
1 7 1n Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69, (N.D.
Ill. 1959), Chief Judge Sullivan, citing Butler, held that an ordinance authorizing a
limited exhibition of a motion picture to persons over 21 years of age was invalid.
18 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19 18 U.S.C. S 1461 (1948). Its pertinent provisions provide: "Every obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication
of an indecent character; and- ....
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice
of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom,
or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained
or made ... whether sealed or unsealed ...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or deliv-
ered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this sec-
tion to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose
of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,"
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the mailing of obscene material. The other case, Alberts v. California,20
involved a Los Angeles bookseller who was convicted of violating the
obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code.21 The Court 22 consid-
ered the dispositive question to be "whether obscenity is utterance within
the area of protected speech and press." 23 The disposition of the question
began by recognizing that the First Amendment was not intended to pro-
tect every utterance. Continuing, the Court stated that:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance .... We hold that obscenity is not within the area of consti-
tutionally protected speech or press. 24
The Court concluded that since "obscenity" was not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech, it was not necessary to consider if such
utterances created a "clear and present danger."
The Court then set out the now famous test of obscenity:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient in-
terest.
25
The Court concluded that since "obscenity" was not within the area of
such a standard for judging obscenity, provided reasonable, ascertainable
standards of guilt and, therefore, were not so vague as to violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Warren, in a concurring opinion, would limit the deci-
sion to the facts before the Court. It is interesting to note two of his addi-
tional observations. First, that the present laws depend largely upon the
effect that the material may have upon the audience who receives them.2 6
This issue, i.e., whether the test of obscenity varies with the nature of its
primary audience, is one which the Court touches upon a number of
times, recognizes a distinction, but never attempts to define concretely .27
Secondly, he recognizes that the central issue is the conduct of the de-
20 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. S 311 (West 1955).
22 Note: Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in which he was joined
by four other justices.
23 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
24 Id. at 484-85. 25 d. at 489.
26 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13. These recognized authorities maintain that
censorship of material should depend upon the manner in which it is marketed and the
primary audience to which it is sold.
27Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957).
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fendant, not the obscenity of the book, thereby prophesying the impor-
tance of the personal element of scienter in such criminal prosecutions.
Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion, observes that the obscenity of a
particular publication "involves not really an issue of fact but a question
of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind."'28
Evidently, Justice Harlan considers the issue of "obscenity" as a mixed
question of law and fact, a belief in which he has been later joined by a
number of Justices. 29
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissents because he believes
that "freedom of expression can be suppressed if . . . it is so clearly bri-
gaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it,"3° and for the
further reason that any test that turns on what is offensive to the commu-
nity's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of
expression to be squared with the First Amendment.
Roth teaches us that a "clear and present danger" is not necessary where
obscene publications have no social utility. Such publications, if distrib-
uted generally, may be constitutionally banned as "obscene," if they meet
the following standards: 1) The dominant theme of the material consid-
ered as a whole must be obscene; it is not enough if it is obscene in parts.
2) Its obscenity must be judged by its prurient appeal to the average nor-
mal adult, and not by its prurient appeal to the susceptible or immature.
3) The obscenity of the material must be judged in light of contemporary
community standards. 4) And lastly, to be obscene it must appeal to
"prurient interests." This last standard tells us very little, as the words
"obscene" and "prurient" are practically synonymous.
Knowing the qualities which make publications constitutionally ob-
scene, we are still confronted with the question as to what in fact consti-
tutes such obscenity. When it is recognized that the Court considered
"obscenity" as material utterly without social utility, having no literary or
expositive value, and when it is remembered that the Solicitor General's
case in Roth was supported by a carton of blatantly shocking material, it
becomes apparent that the Court's concept of "obscenity" is probably
centered on hard-core pornography. This view is supported by three per
curiam decisions in the term immediately following Roth wherein the
Court unanimously reversed without opinion three United States Court
of Appeals decisions,81 that had upheld censorship of material found "ob-
28/d. at 498.
29 Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter joined Justice Harlan in such an opinion in
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. (1959), as did Justice Stewart in Manual
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
a0 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957).
31 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355
U.S. 371 (1958); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
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scene" by the trial court. In reversing these cases, the Court cited Roth
for authority, making it reasonably clear that the material censored was
not "obscene" under the constitutional requirements.
A look at the record in these cases will shed some light on the kind of
material the Court does not consider constitutionally obscene, and there-
by helps us to understand what is "obscene."
The case of Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago32 involved a French
motion picture, "The Game of Love," which depicts the illicit sexual rela-
tions of a sixteen-year-old boy, both with an older woman and a girl of
his own age. In one scene in the movie the boy is shown completely nude
on a bathing beach among a group of younger girls after a boating acci-
dent. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals, 33
which had concluded that the film was obscene and immoral.
The second decision, One, Inc. v. Olesen'34 involved a monthly maga-
zine written to appeal to the tastes and interests of homosexuals called
One-The Homosexual Magazine. The Court of Appeals3 5 found the maga-
zine to be cheap pornography calculated to promote lesbianism, and
therefore non-mailable. The Supreme Court reversed the decision.
The third decision, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,38 concerned a
nudist magazine, Sunshine and Health, that was found obscene because of
photographs showing quite distinctly male and female genital organs. The
holding of the Court of Appeals3 7 that such material was non-mailable was
reversed.
It appears evident from these decisions that constitutional obscenity is
limited to the socially worthless, i.e., something akin to hard-core por-
nography.
The New York Court of Appeals, evidently aware that constitutional
obscenity required something akin to hard-core pornography, rejected
any notion that the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover" was obscene, but up-
held the Regent's denial of a license because the picture as a whole "al-
luringly portrays adultery as proper behavior."38 The Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision39 reversed the New York decision. Six different opin-
ions were written as to why the case should be reversed.
32 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
33 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F. 2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
84 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
85 One, Inc. v. Olesen 477, 241 F. 2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
86 355 U.S. 372 (1957).
3T Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F. 2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
3 8 Matter of Kingsley Corp. v. Regents, 4 N.Y. 2d 349, 151 N.E. 2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.
2d 39 (1958).
89 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The opinion stated
that the First Amendment's "guarantee is not confined to the expresssion
of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advo-
cacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than
advocacy of socialism or the single tax."40 The Court continued that ad-
vocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not a justification for denying
free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement.
Although "obscenity" as defined in Roth is censorable because it has
no social utility, the Court finds that "thematic obscenity," i.e., the advo-
cacy of improper sexual ethics is only censorable when it incites such
improper conduct. Therefore, it appears that a film may advocate any
theme and still be considered of some social value,41 as long as the film
itself is not pornographic. Lacking a pornographic character, a "clear and
present danger" must exist before it is censorable.
Of interest in the concurring opinions is the side debate which takes
place between Justices Black and Harlan. Justice Black maintains that the
immorality of a picture should not be left to the subjective standards of
the members of the Court. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Whittaker
and Frankfurter, meets the issue squarely:
It is sometimes said that this Court should shun considering the particularities
of individual cases in this difficult field lest the Court become a final "board of
censorship." But I cannot understand why it should be thought that the process
of constitutional judgment in this realm somehow stands apart from that in-
volved in other fields, particularly those presenting questions of due process.
Nor can I see, short of holding that all state "censorship" laws are constitu-
tionally impermissible, a course from which the Court is carefully abstaining,
how the Court can hope ultimately to spare itself the necessity for individ-
ualized adjudication. In the very nature of things the problems in this area are
ones of individual cases ... for a "censorship" statute can hardly be contrived
that would in effect be self-executing.42
In Smith v. California43 the appellant was convicted of violating a Los
Angeles ordinance which was construed by the state courts as making him
absolutely liable criminally for the mere possession in his store of a book
later judicially determined to be "obscene"-even though he had no
40 Id. at 689.
4 1 Kalven, The Metaphysics of Obscenity, 1960 SuPREME COURT L. REv. I. The au-
thor notes that Aristotle would disagree: "Not every action or feeling however admits
of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some essentially denote
evil .... All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in them-
selves .... It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them-one must
always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances,
for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman at the right time,
and in the right manner.... [NICOMACHEAN ETHics II, vi, 18-19 (Loeb Classic Library
ed. 1926) ].
42360 U.S. 684, 708 (1959). 43 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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knowledge as to the contents of the book. The conviction was unani-
mously reversed, although five Justices found it necessary to write an
opinion.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court said that although it is compe-
tent for states to create strict criminal liability statutes, it is but a limited
right.44 Notwithstanding that "obscenity" is not constitutionally protected,
it would be violative of the guarantees of free speech to hold a bookseller
criminally liable, even though he had not the slightest notice of the char-
acter of the books he sold. For if such convictions were allowed, non-
obscene books would also be censored as the bookseller would tend to re-
strict the books he sells to those he has inspected. The Court did not pass
on what sort of mental element is required for a constitutionally permissi-
ble prosecution. All it said was that to require no element of scienter is to
unconstitutionally restrict free speech.
It must be remembered that here the Court speaks of the requirement
of scienter in a case involving a criminal prosecution and says nothing
about cases which involve administrative censorship.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in separate concurring opinions,
would reverse the conviction because of the state court's refusal to admit
expert testimony as to the prevailing literary and moral community
standards. To do so, they continued, would be violative of due process
because such evidence goes to the very essence of the defense, as the ob-
scenity of any material is to be judged by contemporary community
standards. The effect of such a holding is to reject the concept that con-
temporary community standards are to be determined solely from the
personal experience of the jurors. The Justices insist that expert testimony
is both relevant and important, and that the rejection of such evidence
amounts to a violation of due process.
The need for such evidence is readily apparent when we recognize
that: 1) contemporary community standards are one of the criteria used
to determine if the material is obscene, and 2) in all the cases to date,
the Court itself has made the constitutional judgment as to whether or not
a particular matter was "obscene." Therefore, if the Court is to continue
to use this criterion it should have some basis upon which to make its
judgment.
In 1961, in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,45 the Supreme Court in a five
.to four decision held that a provision requiring the submission of motion
pictures for examination or censorship prior to their public exhibition is
not void on its face as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
44 For an illuminating analysis of strict criminal liability statutes, see Note, 11 DE
PAUL L. Rav. 329 (1962).
45365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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The Court held that the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press does not include the complete and absolute freedom to exhibit,
at least once, any and every kind of motion picture. The Court rejected
the petitioner's argument that regardless of the capacity for, or extent of,
such an evil, previous restraint cannot be justified.
This decision acts to restrict even further the First Amendment guar-
antee of expression. For not only does it reaffirm that "obscenity" is not
entitled to free speech protection, but it declares that such expression may
be suppressed prior to publication.
Accepting the Supreme Court's position that "obscenity" is beyond the
pale of constitutional protection as it is patently injurious and without
social utility, it, therefore, seems perfectly consistent that society should
be able to prevent the dissemination of such patently injurious material
from the very beginning. The truth of the above statement would not be
subject to attack if it were possible to guarantee that censors are able to
accurately distinguish between the "obscene" and the non-obscene. But
this is not the case. From the nebulousness of the definition of "obscenity,"
it is obvious that many times the non-obscene will be censored along with
the "obscene." The increased restriction on free speech becomes apparent
when it is realized that the publisher of the non-obscene must prevail over
the adverse decision of the censor, "who like any agency and its expertise,
is given a presumption of being correct. '46 Such advantage of the censor
is lost or at least diminished when the publication is generally distributed.
The problem resolves itself to choosing between: 1) restricting free
expression by placing an additional burden on the non-obscene publisher,
i.e., the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the censor, or
2) allowing "obscene" literature to corrupt society, for at least a short
time, before banning it. The Supreme Court chose the first alternative, at
least in the case of motion pictures.
Shortly thereafter in Marcus v. Search Warrant47 the Court appears to
take a contradictory position. There, upon a complaint of a police officer,
and after an ex parte hearing, police officers were granted search warrants
authorizing them to seize all "obscene" material. Justice Brennan speaking
for the Court said:
[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever pro-
cedure it pleases for dealing with obscenity as here involved without regard to
the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.
We believe that Missouri's procedures as applied in this case lacked the safe-
guards which due process demands to assure nonobscene material the consti-
tutional protection to which it is entitled. 48
46 Id. at 83, (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47367 U.S. 717 (1961). 48 1d. at 731 (Emphasis added).
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Therefore, the Court in the Times case sufficiently trusts the censor's
ability to distinguish between the "obscene" and the non-obscene to allow
a "prior restraint," but does not trust the police officer's judgment to
likewise distinguish when the magazines are already on the newsstands.
In the most recent "obscenity" case, Manual Enterprises v. Day,49 the
Judicial Officer of the Post Office Department, after an administrative
hearing, issued a ruling barring a shipment of petitioner's magazines from
the mails under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, on the grounds that: 1) they were them-
selves "obscene," and 2) they gave information as to where "obscene"
matter could be obtained. The Judicial Officer found that the magazines
1) were composed primarily, if not exclusively, for homosexuals and had
no literary, scientific or other merit; 2) would appeal to the "prurient
interests" of such sexual deviates but would not have to be of interest to
sexually normal individuals; 3) are read almost exclusively by homosexu-
als and possibly a few adolescent males; and 4) would not ordinarily be
bought by normal adult males.
Justice Harlan announced the judgment of the Court and, in an opin-
ion in which Justice Stewart joined, he proceeded to "clarify" the Roth
definition of obscenity to a point where it now corresponds almost iden-
tically with the definition proposed by the American Law Institute's
Nodel Penal Code.50 The opinion reads:
rhe Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that Roth made "prurient
interest" appeal the sole test of obscenity. . . . Obscenity under the federal
statute . . . requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent- offensiveness;
and (2) "prurient interest" appeal.51
Material is considered to be "patently offensive" when it goes substan-
tially beyond the customary limits of candor in describing or representing
material appealing to "prurient interests." It must affront the current
community standards of decency. It seems that the "patent offensiveness"
of any material is to be judged by the average adult, regardless of whom
its primary audience may be. The opinion goes on to reverse the Court of
Appeals52 because it finds lacking in the magazines such an element of
''patent offensiveness."
It appears that for material to be presently considered "obscene" it is
not enough that it be socially worthless, but it must also shock the aver-
49370 U.S. 478 (1962).
50A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE, Proposed Official Draft (May 4, 1962), § 251.4 (1):
"Material is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest ... and in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
describing or representing such matters."
51370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962).
52 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F. 2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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age adult in the community. Again the definition indicates that "obscen-
ity" is limited to hard-core pornography.
The Court, by dividing the definition of "obscenity" into two dis-
tinct elements, and then finding that the magazines lack the element of
"patent offensiveness," avoids considering the question of the proper audi-
ence by which their prurient appeal should be judged. The Court of Ap-
peals considered this question, and held that the proper test as to the
magazines' prurient appeal was "the reaction of the average member of
the class for which the magazines were intended, homosexuals." 53
It is evident from this decision that no matter what the proper audi-
ence is, the social worthlessness of an expression, in and of itself, is not
sufficient to ban such an expression. For although Justice Harlan does not
consider publications catering to the "prurient interests" of homosexuals
as "patently offensive" (one wonders what will constitute "patent offen-
siveness"), it cannot be doubted that such publications are of no social
value. As homosexuality is contra to the interests of any society, maga-
zines which devote themselves solely to promoting homosexuality must
be socially worthless.
Continuing, Justice Harlan considered the question of the relevant
community standard:
We think that the proper test under this federal statute, reaching as it does to
all parts of the United States whose population reflects many different ethnic
and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency.54
The logic of this opinion may be subject to attack, but certainly not its
practicality. To hold otherwise would require the Court to consider the
contemporary community standard of each community in which the pub-
lication was distributed, creating the possibility that it might be "obscene"
in state A, but not in state B.
And finally, Justice Harlan would reverse because he deems that scien-
ter is necessary to hold a publisher civilly responsible.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Warren and Douglas, would reverse
the judgment because legislative history indicates that § 1461 is exclusively
penal, 55 and it does not authorize the Post Office to act administratively as
a censor.
Justice Clark, as the lone dissenter, would affirm the judgment on the
sole ground that the magazines contain information as to where "obscene"
material can be obtained and thus are non-mailable.
He takes issue with the contention that § 1461 is exclusively penal, citing
contrary legislative history and pointing out that § 1461 explicitly pro-
53 1d. at 456.
54 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Emphasis added).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948).
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vides that such material "is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any
letter carrier." 56
Justice Clark also maintains that the element of scienter on the part of
the sender is irrelevant in determining the material's mailability.
Congress could not have made it more clear that the sender's knowledge of the
material to be mailed did not determine its mailability but only his responsi-
bility for mailing it. Nor is there any reason why Congress-in a civil action-
should have wanted it any other way. The sender's knowledge of the matter
sought to be mailed is immaterial to the harm caused to the public by its dis-
semination.57
As was stated earlier, in "obscenity" cases the opinions are many and
varied, but although the law is not clear, a certain number of principles
have come forward to guide our future conduct.
As a general rule, publications in a community may be censored be-
cause they are "obscene" or because they present a "clear and present
danger" of unlawful conduct.
If the publication is "obscene," nothing else need be shown, as the pub-
lication's very nature is sufficient to justify censorship. A criminal sanc-
tion however will not attach unless the publisher's criminal intent is
proven. The Court has yet to establish the kind of mental element neces-
sary.
It is also clear, from past practice and from the opinions of all but one
Justice, that the question of "obscenity" is a matter for "constitutional
judgment." To date, this "constitutional judgment" has set out the fol-
lowing requirements, before material will be considered "obscene": 1)
The "obscenity" of publications distributed generally must be judged by
its appeal to the average normal adult. The Court has avoided considering
the applicable standard when the material is distributed to a special group.
2) The dominant theme of the material considered as a whole must be
obscene; it is not enough if it is obscene in parts. 3) The "obscenity" of
the material must be judged in the light of contemporary community
standards. The size of the community will probably correspond to the
jurisdiction within which the statute is effective, and expert testimony
will probably be considered relevant and competent in determining this
standard. 4) The material to be "obscene" must appeal to "prurient inter-
ests" and be "patently offensive," i.e., it must be socially worthless and
grossly shocking to the average adult.
Considering the various standards and the Court's application of these
standards, it appears that the limitation on the First Amendment applies
56 370 U.S. 478, 521 (1962).
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